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SOCIAL NETWORKS AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT IN IT 
OUTSOURCING 
 
Abstract 
 
Most prior research on Information Technology Outsourcing(ITO) has characterized the dominant 
governance modes as either ‘Formal’ or ‘Relational,’ which rely on stringent assumptions of perfect 
foresight or about the extent to which one party can punish unilateral deviations by the other. We 
propose a third alternative in addition to dyadic measures of inter-firm reputation. The reputation of 
an actor may be associated with how the firm is positioned in a network, which in turn influences how 
information about a particular actor flows within the network. Such aspects of structural 
embeddedness suggest a role in predicting characteristics of inter-firm exchange. The network capital 
offers a measure to mitigate the uncertainty associated the nature of service outsourced and the 
service provider. The network of trading partners enables a community enforcement of contracting 
terms by providing safeguards that may not be offered by traditional measures of formal or relational 
governance.  
Based on a large dataset of publicly announced ITO arrangements, we examine the role that 
structural embeddedness can play in predicting contract duration. Our preliminary results are very 
encouraging. We find evidence suggesting that network position does matter in predicting contract 
structure over and above the traditional economic variables.  
Keywords: Social Network, Reputation, IT Outsourcing, Contract governance 
 
 
 
 
  
1 INTRODUCTION 
Firms have always aimed to exploit economies of scale and scope (Chandler, 1990). However, recent 
advances in information technology (IT) have enabled firms to harness these capabilities from beyond 
the rigid boundaries of the firm (Gurbaxani and Whang, 1991; Malone et al., 1987). Boeing Defense 
Operations introduced two prototypes of its ‘Joint Strike Fighter’ using only fifty-eight employees in 
its Palmdale, California facility -- the rest of the organization comprised of hundreds of 
geographically dispersed suppliers (Quinn, 2000). Case studies of virtualized organizations like 
Boeing, as well as Dell and Intel underline the dominance of IT Outsourcing as the preferred mode of 
sourcing IT capability.  
The market for IT outsourcing (ITO) is predicted to reach $290 billion by 2010(Gartner, 2006) and 
the average contract size of the top 100 outsourcing deals of 2005 is $700 million (IDC, 2006). 
However, studies have shown that large numbers of contractual disputes and unraveled outsourcing 
relationships are not uncommon (DiamondCluster, 2006). Given the global acceptance of ITO as a 
critical business thrust, it becomes imperative for firms undertaking ITO to gauge the potential of 
non-cooperative behavior by the other party. 
Despite rigorous vendor evaluation procedures, ex-ante verification of the vendors’ ability can be 
difficult (Banerjee and Duflo, 2000; Kalnins and Mayer, 2004) Quality certifications like “CMM-
levels1” have been shown to be either ineffective (Bannerjee and Duflo, 2000) or merely a costly 
signal (Gopal and Gao, 2008).  Thus vendor selection based on the firm’s organizational, financial or 
human capital alone need not predict a long term outsourcing relationship. An often cited reason for 
failed outsourcing relationships is the challenges posed by governance.  
Several early papers that examined contracting in IT outsourcing advance the view that governance 
mechanisms ought to be as explicit, and contracts as complete as possible (Hirschheim and Lacity, 
2000; Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993; Lacity and Willcocks, 1998).  At the same time, several other 
researchers have argued that the costs of enforcement render it difficult to draft a truly complete 
contract, and posited that mechanisms such as reputation and repeated relationships offer a more 
effective governance structure (Banerjee and Duflo, 2000). 
Both streams of prior literature make stringent assumptions on what can be contractible or what can 
be enforceable between parties. The stream of literature that argues for formal contracts as 
enforcement devices assumes that a third party is ex-post able to both observe and verify the 
contractual contingencies, that were specified ex-ante. On the other hand, relational contracting 
models, while relaxing the assumption of verifiability, assume that the parties involved interact 
repeatedly, that contracting parties have symmetric information about the realization of outcomes and 
that any potential deviations in cooperative behavior are detected and punished (Baker et al., 2002; 
Brown et al., 2004).  
In the case of ITO both of these assumptions are strong assumptions to make. An ITO arrangement 
typically includes requirements that are difficult to verify and difficult to specify ex ante (Banerjee 
and Duflo, 2000; Kalnins and Mayer, 2004) (Banerjee and Duflo, 2000),(Kalnins and Mayer, 2004). 
This limits the extent to which formal contracts can protect parties from rent appropriation. IT 
outsourcing, even if undertaken with the same vendor, need not involve the repeated exchange of 
identical products or services, as usually assumed in relational contracting models (Baker et al., 
2002). This makes IT outsourcing the ideal platform to test the role of alternate reputation 
mechanisms in enforcing contract terms.  
In this paper we study the role of network capital in governance of IT outsourcing contracts. Inter-
organizational networks arise in this market from the stock of past outsourcing transactions conducted 
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 Capability Maturity Models range from level 1 to level 5. Achieving level 5 is seen as recognition of a vendor’s process 
capability and is not a measure of output quality.  
across a broad spectrum of firms. The network can serve as a conduit for relational information about 
potential exchange partners. The reputation of a firm can be a result of how the firm is positioned in a 
network, which influences how much information about the particular firm flows within the network; 
thus, the “structural embeddedness” of a firm is important. 
The aspect of structural embeddedness in relation to contract characteristics is different from the 
dyadic measures of reputation in economics literature or relational embeddedness in sociology. Such 
dyadic measures can be a source of relationship specificity that strengthens contracts (Brown et al., 
2004) or a determinant of contract characteristics in a future transaction (Banerjee and Duflo, 2000). 
However, the relationship can also act as signals of underlying quality of the participants to other 
participants in the network beyond the dyad (Podolny, 2001).  
Structural embeddedness also adds to the transaction cost economics argument of ‘fundamental 
transformation’ or ‘small numbers bargaining’ (Uzzi, 1997). If we were to buy the premise of 
relational contracting (that successful prior engagement introduces relationship specificity) the market 
for ITO would be limited to dyads of exchange partners locked into bilateral trading relationships. 
The reason for this being that when specific investments are important to an exchange, parties prefer 
to insulate themselves from competition ex post; preferring to continue in bilateral exchange because 
the value of trading together outweighs the advantages of trading with others. However, the existence 
of firms with multiple trading partners suggests that reputation and relational embeddedness does not 
completely explain the choice of partners. Looking at this from a structural embeddedness 
perspective, we can argue that structure provides a mechanism for preventing opportunism through 
communal enforcement (Kandori, 1992), which allows firms to benefit from the expansion of its 
network(Beckman et al., 2004; Uzzi, 1997)  
In summary, we suggest that the networked nature of ITO industry provides an environment where 
the network could affect the nature of the contract. Specifically, the identity of the trading partner in 
the network characterized by proximity and centrality (Robinson and Stuart, 2006), play an additional 
role in governance as measured in the duration of the initial and the renewed contract. 
2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 
2.1 The nature of uncertainty 
IT Outsourcing poses a unique challenge in the extent to which both clients and firms experience 
uncertainty. Broadly the uncertainty can be classified as uncertainty pertaining to the nature of service 
and uncertainty pertaining to the nature of the service provider. This bifurcation is consistent with the 
ego-centric and alter-centric uncertainty arguments of Podolny (Podolny, 2001).  
Literature identifies a few sources of service-related uncertainty as the ex-ante uncertainty in cost 
(Kalnins and Mayer, 2004), requirements, project size, resources (Gopal et al., 2003); and ex-post 
uncertainty in quality (Kalnins and Mayer, 2004) and outcomes (Eisenhardt, 1989). Given the rapidly 
changing nature of the industry and user expectations it is not surprising that longer-term projects 
often require changes in design and product architecture (Nidumolu, 1995). Literature on software 
project management has recognized that ‘software development is an information intensive activity, 
and decision points are continually reached where the decision maker possesses inadequate 
information’ (Zmud, 1979). Applications with induction-based algorithms such as those that support 
planning, forecasting, and management decision-making activities are more complex and than 
applications with rule-based algorithms that support operational and transaction-processing activities 
(Banker and Slaughter, 2000). Therefore it is difficult for end user organizations to completely specify 
ex-ante the requirements that need to be met by the vendor especially for business-support functions 
typically outsourced. 
Theoretical literature on contracting posits that difficulty in describing task structure is a source of 
contractual incompleteness (Dye, 1985). The difficulty in describing complex IT contracts imposes 
limits on enumerating contractual provisions in detail. Potential contingencies are seldom defined 
satisfactorily at the outset and further, negotiating mutually acceptable solutions in the event of a 
dispute is laborious. This limitation in specifying governance parameters completely is only worsened 
in the presence of service-related uncertainty (Segal, 1999). 
The second source of uncertainty is in anticipating vendor ability (Bannerjee and Duflo, 2000). Given 
asymmetric information, vendors could behave opportunistically ex-post. Incomplete contracts can 
further increase the costly process of governing opportunistic vendors. It has been suggested that 
tighter contracts be employed (Goles and Hirschheim, 2000; Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993; Lacity and 
Willcocks, 1998).  It has also been suggested that the solution lay in relying on repeated relationships 
as a more effective governance structure (Banerjee and Duflo, 2000). However, given that there are 
limits to legal protection by contracts, there is a necessity for other more proactive governance 
mechanisms.  
2.2 The role of contract duration 
The interaction of uncertainty with rapidly changing technology in the IT industry creates a need for 
constant renegotiation between the client and the firm. Further, outsourcing relationships need to 
provide incentives for specific investments by the vendors to ensure meeting the specific and complex 
demands of the ITO arrangement. We consider two key roles that contract duration plays in contract 
governance.  
On one hand, renegotiation costs constitute a significant portion of the total cost of outsourcing 
(Williamson, 1985).  Long term contracts can also induce better sharing of gains from trade (Brown et 
al., 2004; Joskow, 1987; Masten and Crocker, 1985). Consistently, ITO service providers prefer long-
term contracts to ensure a longer stream of revenue just as clients appreciate the lower cost of 
repeated haggling.  
On the other hand, clients may in fact chose to sign shorter term contracts if they could rule out 
service-related uncertainty. Client firms would benefit from not being locked in to a long term 
contract, they could offer higher-powered incentives through repeated spot contracts and ensure the 
highest effort levels from the service providers. Client firms would then successfully have avoided the 
small-numbers bargaining problem that often creates excessive switching costs when wishing to 
terminate a contract. Literature in software engineering warns us of the complexity that arises with 
contract duration. Longer projects often call for re-doing requirements analysis given the difficulty in 
foreseeing future requirements (Jenkins et al., 1984) and are liable to slippages in schedule, leading to 
more costs further along the project (Pressman). This suggests that given the choice, projects ought to 
be as short as possible if project related uncertainty can be reduced.  
Therefore we assert that in the presence of service specific uncertainty contract durations are likely to 
be shorter while in the presence of service-provider specific uncertainty, the duration of contracts are 
likely to be longer.  
3 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
Summarizing the theoretical arguments we can conclude that the firms’ ex-ante decision on the 
optimal contract duration is likely to be influenced by how well it can mitigate uncertainty related to 
the project and vendors’ ability. This presents our overarching research question – How does network 
position affect the choice of contract duration?  
To examine this question we propose a framework that considers possible strategies that firms could 
adopt in the context of overlapping uncertainties. Table 1 below, illustrates the interaction of service 
uncertainty with service-provider uncertainty and possible strategies. 
 
 
 
  Service provider Uncertainty: LOW Service provider Uncertainty: HIGH 
Limited application of social capital in 
predicting vendor behavior.  
Hypothesis 1: Mitigating service provider 
uncertainty allows longer contract duration 
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 Possible strategies to mitigate service provider 
uncertainty 
 
• Seek alternate measures of vendor 
reputation from many other vendors. 
• Seek the opinion of key client firms 
Hypothesis 2: Exposing service-related 
uncertainty can allow shorter contracts 
Hypothesis 3: Contracting with vendors that 
are reputed among other vendors will likely be 
of longer duration 
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Possible strategies to mitigate service-level 
uncertainty  
 
• Competitive bidding between vendors  
Possible strategies to mitigate both kinds of 
uncertainty.  
 
• Identify central vendors in the industry 
• Benchmark vendor abilities  
Table 1. Data Summary 
In the presence of low levels of uncertainty in both dimensions, intrinsic measures of organizational 
capital are likely to be associated with longer contract duration. This offers our base-line hypothesis.  
In the situation where uncertainty about the nature of the service provider is high while uncertainty 
about the service itself is low we hypothesize that the focal client firm would aim to reduce service 
provider specific uncertainty. Reducing this uncertainty can allow client firms to sign longer contracts 
and. Focal client firms could rely on the reputational capital that the vendor has accumulated by 
association with a more client firms. In addition, the focal firms could rely on observing the status of 
the clients that the service provider firms associates with. (Hypothesis 1)   
In the context of high service level uncertainty but fairly low levels of service provider uncertainty 
focal firms could easily exploit its position of leverage to pit one vendor against another to reveal 
service specific uncertainty. We hypothesise that doing so would allow the client firm to sign a 
contract of shorter duration and completely avail the benefits of the market. (Hypothesis 2) 
From the perspective of the focal client firm, the significance of social capital as a measure of 
reputation takes most importance in the presence of uncertainty in both dimensions. Focal client firms 
would likely aim to reduce both vendor level uncertainty as well as service level uncertainty, or 
alternatively the client might do away with strategies to reduce uncertainty on its own and instead 
entrust outsourcing to vendors that have built up a position of ‘reputation’. It is conceivable that such 
capable vendors have occupied a position of high status not just among the entire network of clients 
and vendors but even among the population of vendors themselves. We hypothesize that when clients 
contract with vendors who hold high status amongst the set of vendors, clients would be amenable to 
signing longer term contracts.  
The measure of status in a unipartite projection of a bipartite network needs special attention. In a 
unipartite projection of the vendor network, a tie between two vendors is formed when they share a 
common client. Therefore a central vendor in this network is one that belongs to a group of vendors 
that share the same clients. It is likely that centrality in this unipartite network therefore indicates 
belonging to a set of preferred vendors. From the perspective of a focal client, contracting with such 
preferred vendors should reassure them of non-opportunism for two reasons. It is likely that vendor 
firms have occupied this position of centrality owing to repeated non-opportunistic behaviour. 
Alternately it is likely being a part of a preferred set of vendors, the cost of opportunistic behaviour to 
the vendor is disproportionately greater than the benefits of deviation in any one contract due to the 
possibility of being removed from this set of preferred service providers.  
4 THE DATA 
Our dataset comprises of public announcements of outsourcing contracts awarded. For the purposes of 
our analysis, an outsourcing arrangement refers to a multiyear relationship in which one or more 
vendor firms are assigned the responsibility of providing an IT service to a client firm. This definition 
is consistent with both academic research as well as industry analysts (Grover et al., 1996; IDC, 2006; 
Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993). A typical public announcement is of the following form: “Firm A 
awarded Firm B a contract worth $X for providing service S for a duration T.” However, not every 
announcement needs to have disclosed all the above elements. Often contract value, duration or the 
services included are not mentioned in the announcement. 
4.1 The Outsourcing Organization Network 
Our sample includes announcements that were published during the period 1985 to 2005. However, 
due to small sample sizes for the years prior to 1994, we restrict our sample to the period 1994-2004. 
The number of unique contracts in the entire time period is 2518. At minimum these announcements 
provide the client’s and vendor’s identity. From these we identify a sub-sample of non-government 
contracts that provide, in addition, the contract value and duration. This subsample comprises of 914 
unique observations. This distinction is relevant as our research method relies on both social network 
variables as well as econometric variables. The former requires knowledge of the identity of the 
contractors while the latter require knowledge of the content of the contract.  
To create the network of IT outsourcers we use the entire sample, which provides complete 
information of the actors involved in the transaction. The network measures are then computed from 
this entire network. However, for purposes of econometric analysis that require contract information 
we limit ourselves to the sub-sample that contains contract information. Government contracts were 
excluded in the econometric analysis as contract structure and the contracting process for government 
contracts are likely to be very different from non-government contracts.  
The data comes from two sources. During the time period 1994-2000, one of the authors maintained a 
personal database of publicly announced ITO contracts. The second half of the data (period 1999-
2004) comes from a professional industry analysis firm whose name we are obliged to keep 
confidential2. As part of their routine research and analysis activity, this firm updates their database 
with announcements of ITO contracts that were released through various newswire services. 
 
  Whole sample 
 Statistics Contracts duration Revenue($million) Employees 
(1000's) 
EBITDA 
($million) 
           
mean 6.45 4.81 8773.17 33.70 1508.63 
sd 26.53 2.87 16701.22 66.29 3647.66 
min 1 1 0.29 0.009 -166.266 
p50 1 5 1408.502 9 134.2 
max 312 20 81667 443 29065 
V
end
o
rs
 
N 374 216 180 161 180 
mean 1.56 6.00 17177.82 49.41 3437.33 
sd 2.12 3.04 35707.15 84.32 10040.02 
Clients
 
min 1 0.4 1.789 0.038 -1808 
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 Contracts that had been captured in both datasets in the year 2000 have been included only once. 
p50 1 5 5374.759 21.59 905.06 
max 51 20 156911.9 905.77 118107.00 
N 1544 1056 379 355 377 
  Restricted sample 
          
mean 7.59 5.56 12309.52 38.29 2064.92 
sd 29.63 2.94 18393.29 65.71 4311.18 
min 1 1 0.29 0.009 -166.266 
p50 1 5 3426.69 9.95 310.10 
max 278 20 81667.00 291.07 19804.00 
V
end
o
rs
 
N 100 100 54 48 54 
mean 1.52 6.90 15150.98 41.04 2180.65 
sd 1.49 3.05 26404.13 63.03 3585.01 
min 1 1 1.789 0.038 -1808 
p50 1 7 4122.47 19.14 932.75 
max 17 20 156911.90 484.00 25568.00 
Clients
 
N 563 563 183 174 184 
Table 2 Data Summary 
This dataset is then appended with firm characteristics obtained from Compustat, a company that 
provides public financial information on companies. Using Compustat we augment our dataset with 
information about the firms such as number of employees, revenue, and earnings during the year in 
which the contract was signed. Summary statistics are provided in Table 2.  
Actors involved in the 2412 contracts are 1544 unique client firms and 374 unique vendors. The 
number of contracts per vendor range from 1 to 312. On average each vendor has 6.44 contracts over 
the 11 years. In terms of firm characteristics, client firms, on average, earn a revenue of $18.8 billion, 
has an EBITDA of $2.9 billion and employs 51,300 employees. The average service provider on the 
other hand, earns revenues of $8.1billion, an EBITDA of $1.2 million with 29,900 employees3. When 
comparing summary statistics across the whole sample versus the restricted sample, we note no 
statistical difference in the summary statistics of the two networks.  
4.2 Social Network structure 
An edge in this network corresponds to an ITO contract between a client firm and a service provider 
firm. The two actors associated with each tie belong to two modes, namely clients and vendors. This 
two-mode structure allows us to examine the network as both bipartite, comprised of clients and 
service providers, as well as a unipartite projection of the bipartite graph comprised of either all 
clients or all service providers. The former lets us understand the nature of the industry structure as a 
whole while the latter allows us to understand the structure of firms among its own kind. In the 
unipartite projection an edge between two firms represents a connection between the two firms that 
either provide service to a common client or receive service from a common vendor.  
4.2.1 Social Network Structure – Bipartite 
This set of relationships is captured over the 11-year time period 1994-2004. There exists a significant 
spike in the number of contracts in the year 1999. This can be attributed to the sudden uptake in ITO 
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 Clients financial attributes are statistically different from that of vendor financial attributes (revenue and ebitda are 
different at p<0.01 while number of employees is different at p <.07) 
given the fear of the “Y2K bug”. We see a corresponding drop in the network density measure.  
Therefore while the total volume of outsourcing was less before 1999, the network was denser than it 
was after 1999. 
year ‘94 ’95  ’96  ’97  ’98  ’99  ’00  ’01  ’02  ’03  ’04  Overall 
Edges 44 71 69 60 52 525 220 322 231 289 202 2041 
Density 0.01 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.0006 
Table 3. Network Density over time 
The complete network exhibits the typical core-periphery structure. The core corresponds to the large 
interconnected main component of the graph. Almost unconnected from the core are various smaller 
components comprising the periphery. 
 
  
Figure 1. Left: Bipartite Graph of the entire network laid out using Frucheterman-Reingold 
algorithm; red: service providers, blue: clients. Key service provider firms labelled. 
Right: Unipartite Graph of the service provider firms radius of the node is proportional to 
the vendors Eigen vector centrality 
4.2.2 Social Network Structure –unipartite 
The unipartite projection of the bipartite graph allows us to examine the meta-network structure of 
two actors linked to each other through the common linkage with an actor of the other mode. For 
instance, two service providers are tied when they both contract for services with a common client. 
Average centralization measures for the clients’ unipartite graph and the service providers’ unipartite 
graph are compared to the overall bipartite graph in table 4.  
 
 Bi-partite Unipartite-Clients Unipartite-Vendors 
 
Degree 
Centrality 
Normalized 
Degree 
Degree 
Centrality 
Normalized 
Degree 
Degree 
Centrality 
Normalized 
Degree Mean 2.51 0.01 115.49 0.62 8.10 0.06 
St. Dev. 12.00 0.07 131.16 0.71 26.9 0.22 
Min 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 312 1.80 966 5.2 311 2.53 
Network 
Centralization 1.79% 4.6 % 2.43% 
Normalized 
Network 
Centralization 
 
1.19% 0.08% 2.97% 
Table 4 Network Description 
Since the data is treated as binary ties for the paper, we compare the normalized network 
centralization to assess the extent of network activity in either unipartite graph. Normalized network 
centralization is measured as the sum of the difference between the maximum degree centrality and 
each nodes degree centrality divided by the maximum degree centrality.  
5 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
5.1 Network measures 
In the interest of space, we present the set of network measures analyzed in the appropriate cells in the 
figure below.  
Hypothesis  Network Measure 
H1: Mitigating service provider uncertainty 
allows longer contract duration 
A: Vendors degree centrality in the two-mode network 
B: Vendors Eigen vector centrality in the two mode 
network 
H2: Exposing service-related uncertainty can 
allow shorter contracts 
C: Clients’ degree centrality in the two-mode network 
H3: Contracting with vendors that are 
reputed among other vendors will likely be of 
longer duration 
D: Vendors’ degree centrality in the one-mode network 
E: Vendors’ Eigen vector centrality in the one-mode 
network of vendors   
Table 5 Network Measures 
5.1.1 Control Variables 
The decision by firms to sign a contract of a particular duration can be affected by intrinsic factors of 
the firm such as firms’ human and financial capital. In order to avoid the possibility that such firm 
specific factors drive the relationship between contract duration and network characteristics, we 
control for service provider characteristics such as number of employees, earnings margin, and 
revenue per employee. Similarly we control for client size as measured by number of employees and 
revenue. 
5.2 Model estimation and results  
As our dependent and independent variables are both node-level measures we use an ordinary least 
squares regression model with robust error correction for multi-way clusters (Cameron et al., 2008). 
The use of the multi-way cluster correction allows for controlling for heteroskedasticity introduced 
through the clustering of errors due to repeated service provider firms and client firms across the data. 
The dependent variable is the contract duration.  
Model: Duration = α + β1 (network measure) + γ(Client specific control Variables) + δ(service 
provider specific control variables) + ε 
Estimation results are presented in table 6 below4. We do not report the coefficients on the control 
variable in the interest of space. We find support for hypothesis 1 and 3 but not for hypothesis 2.  
VARIABLES Duration 
Vendor 2-m normalized degree 1.08***  (.41) 
 
    
Vendor 2-mode Eigen Vector  0.02* (.01) 
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 In order to ensure robustness we considered different models with different error structures namely errors clustered by 
client firms, FGLS estimation and sample splits by high and low duration. The results have been generally consistent with 
the OLS model. 
Client 2-m normalized degree   1.50 (7.04)   
Vendor 1-m normalized degree    0.75** (.54)  
Vendor 1-mode Eigen Vector     0.05*** (.02) 
Constant 6.79*** 7.39*** 7.64*** 6.68*** 6.80*** 
Observations 430 430 430 430 430 
R-squared 0.189 0.165 0.150 0.184 0.184 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 6 OLS Estimation results (robust standard errors accounting for multi-way clusters are 
reported in parentheses)  
6 DISCUSSION 
We find that the nature of reputational capital can play different roles in mitigating ex-ante 
uncertainty. The structural embeddedness of a vendor, within a network of clients and vendors, offers 
an indication of both vendors ability and the propensity to behave less opportunistically. The fact that 
the vendor manages many contracts would suggest that an opportunistic behavior with one client 
would easily be known to a large set of potential clients. Building on this observation we see that a 
vendors association with many clients is likely to lead to longer contract duration, we see that the 
vendors association to more central clients is also a significant indicator of longer contract duration.                
The other channel by which vendors’ reputation carries is the meta-network provided by network of 
vendors that share common ties. The association of a vendor to another vendor, albeit through a set of 
clients, offers an indication that the vendor belongs to a set of vendors, which if high in status, is a 
group in which the focal vendor may not wish to lose status in through opportunistic behavior.  
In the case where the focal client can form a fairly informed opinion about the nature of the vendor 
but is unsure about the nature of uncertainty about the service itself, the strategy is clearly one of 
brokerage. The focal client’s access to a pool of vendors places the client in a position to undertake 
competitive bidding so that uncertainty in service requirements is overridden at the cost of the vendor. 
Access to a set of vendors also provides the clients with opportunities to educate themselves on the 
service-related uncertainty by inviting prototypes from service providers. However in our current 
estimation we do not find support for this hypothesis. Perhaps controlling for the client firms’ size 
removes the effect of status in the network.  
7 LIMITATIONS  
In the current version of the study we have identified a few data limitations and a few the empirical 
methods. In terms of data, relying on public information has its advantages and disadvantages. While 
we are exempt from biases associated with respondents’ perceptions we are limited in the breadth of 
variables that can be studied. One could also argue that the publicly announced outsourcing 
arrangements are systematically different. However, we feel that vendors and clients in the industry 
are also recipients of the same public information and hence are likely to perform their mental 
calculus based on similar, if not the same, information.  
Our current estimates pass the statistical tests of homoskedasticity and multicollinearity. However, 
passing the test of homoskedasticity only implies that the error structure assumed in the test is absent. 
Since there is no indication suggesting the exact nature of the covariance matrix we adopt an approach 
where we do not place any a priori assumptions on the error structure and instead perform a bootstrap 
estimation with multiple clusters in the error covariance matrix.  
We currently do not account for the temporal changes in the network structure. Currently we are 
working on addressing this aspect. We also do not control for the specific services that are included in 
the bundle of services outsourced due to the there being limited theory on which bundle of services 
are likely to be more complex than the other. However given the large number of observations and the 
lack of any obvious systematic association between duration and service type we assume service type 
to be orthogonal to the independent variables thus limiting the omitted variable bias. However this 
dimension does require investigation.  
8 CONCLUSION 
The aspect of reputation mitigating uncertainty has received some attention in the literature however 
to the best of our knowledge social capital as a measure of reputation in the context of ITO has yet to 
be examined. In the preliminary stage of this paper we find strong indication that our research 
framework is valid and that the hypotheses that emerge from the framework are testable. There are 
various directions that this work will be extended in further papers. We anticipate the ability to sort 
the ITO arrangements by the nature of service. It is foreseeable that our data can be split by the nature 
of services outsourced. For e.g.  Transaction processing services are likely to fall under the quadrant 
where service uncertainty is low, while outsourcing knowledge work will likely be associated with 
higher service uncertainty. Based on such classification we can test if the reputational capital matter 
more for certain types of services than others. Given the rich literature available in sociology on the 
nature of social capital we envisage the development of richer theory in Information Systems on 
predicting the likelihood of contract design in the contemporary practice of Outsourcing and 
Offshoring.  
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